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Media Reporting and Privacy Claims
-Decline in Constitutional Protection
for the Press
By GERALD G. ASHDOWN*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has frequently
been faced with the task of safeguarding freedom of speech and
press under the commands of the first amendment. This exer-
cise has been complicated by the continual clash between free-
dom of expression and some other value, both demanding pro-
tection and deserving recognition. The court has had to balance
these competing interests in order to reach a solution to the
problems created by this conflict. Given the pervasive influ-
ence and broad scope of the first amendment,I this value con-
flict has characteristically been resolved by giving priority to
freedom of speech and press.2 For example, in past decisions
the Court has protected pornography, 3 defamatory publica-
tions,4 invasions of privacy,5 politial activity of a potentially
disruptive nature,' and, at the expense of school administra-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972,
University of Iowa.
The primary function of freedom of speech and press is to keep citizens informed
so that they may govern themselves effectively. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is
An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Rav. 245, 254-56. See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
389 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); Bloustein, The FirstAmend-
ment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RurTanS L.
REV. 41, 42-51 (1974). Freedom of speech also serves a self-fulfillment function, see
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970). As such, freedom of
expression protects not only each citizen in the transfer of ideas and information, but
also preserves society itself through the facilitation of participatory democracy.
I But see, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Communist Party
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36 (1961); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1 See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5 E.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
1 E.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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tion, symbolic political speech.7 In all of these cases the Su-
preme Court has given preference to free expression because
the impact of free speech and press on our sociopolitical system
of informed self-government is more important than the occa-
sional and isolated harm to an individual or group of individu-
als.
The Conflict between interests and the concomitant need
for first amendment protection are probably most apparent
when freedom of the press collides with the personal interests
protected by the law of defamation and by the law of privacy.
To the extent that defamation or privacy judgments are readily
available against the media, self-restraint and the consequent
reduction of information flowing to the public will result. This
subtle, though powerful, restrictive impact would not only
impose a direct chilling effect on the press, but would also limit
the system of freedom of expression, for free expression de-
pends on the dissemination of ideas and information to facili-
tate its exercise.'
Realizing the potential inhibitory effect on freedom of
speech and press, the United States Supreme Court has sought
to protect the media from actions which allege defamation and
invasion of privacy."0 During the ten years preceding the
Court's 1974 decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.," plaintiffs
were required to show malice on the part of media defendants
in order to recover for defamation or invasion of privacy. In
Gertz, however, the Court permitted a private plaintiff to re-
cover in an action for defamation if media negligence could be
shown. 2 Regardless of whether the majority in Gertz was at-
' Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8 See Meiklejohn, supra note 1, at 255-57.
9 See note 4 supra for a sample of such defamation cases.
, See note 5 supra for examples of privacy cases.
" 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" Justice Powell's majority opinion stated: "[S]o long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual." Id. at 347. Although this language did not expressly mention negligence,
it left the states free to adopt a standard based on reasonable care and many states
accepted the invitation. See, e.g., Helton v. United Press Int'l, 303 So.2d 650 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 543 P.2d 1356 (Hawaii 1975);
Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 531 P.2d
76 (Kan. 1975); Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 689 (Md. 1976); Stone v.
Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Thomas H. Maloney &
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tempting to provide increased protection for the reputation of
private persons or was instituting a policy of media control,'3
it is clear that the Court's treatment of defamation will have a
substantial impact on actions for invasion of privacy." The
interests protected by the law of defamation and by the law of
privacy, although different, are similar enough to warrant ap-
plication of the policies underlying the Gertz decision to pri-
vacy torts.'5 And certainly if the current Court's intent is to
limit media power and influence, privacy law is as fertile a
ground for such restraint as defamation.
The impact on privacy law created by the Supreme
Court's change in philosophy is conspicuously demonstrated by
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.'" In Zacchini,
the Court held that the presentation on a television news show
of a fifteen-second film of a human cannonball act was not
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments from a claim
based on appropriation of the right of publicity. The Court
clearly characterized the case as a privacy action," and the
decision portends, as in the case of defamation, the trend away
from first amendment protection for the media in the area of
mass publication torts.
Using Zacchini, the Burger Court's defamation decisions,"
and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn," a privacy decision
which protected the publication of material appearing in judi-
cial records, I will examine media publication and reporting in
an attempt to assess potential press liability for privacy inva-
sions. In doing so, it is necessary to examine three of Dean
Sons v. V. E. W. Scripps Co., 334 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App.), cert. denied 423 U.S.
883 (1974); Exner v. American Medical Ass'n, 529 P.2d 863 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). See
also, Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1975), in which the New York Court of Appeals apparently adopted a gross negligence
standard. Id. at 571.
,1 See Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study In Constitutional Policy-Making,
61 MINN. L. REv. 645 (1977).
11 "Invasion of privacy" as used here includes three of Prosser's four categories of
privacy actions. See note 20 infra and accompanying text for these categories.
15 See notes 46-50 infra and accompanying text for a comparison of these interests.
" 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
' Id. at 573-74.
IB Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
", 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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Prosser's categories of privacy torts: public disclosure, falsifica-
tion, and appropriation. This analysis is necessary not only
because these are different torts with different philosophical
and legal foundations, but also because the Supreme Court has
tended to view them as distinct in formulating constitutional
doctrine applicable to each.2" Careful examination discloses a
trend of diminishing constitutional protection for the press in
each of these categories of privacy law. Whether this signals an
attempt on the part of the Court to realign competing interests
or whether it signals the development of a policy of media
supervision, it is clear that the impact of a free press in Ameri-
can society will be reduced if the perceived trend continues.
I. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
Two reasons suggest that a discussion of privacy and the
first amendment should begin with consideration of the tort of
public disclosure of private facts. First, it is the original and
true privacy tort;22 second, in public disclosure cases the value
conflict between freedom of speech and individual privacy is
most direct. 3 The publication of entirely truthful material, al-
though facilitating the first amendment goal of an informed
These are three of the four categories into which Prosser divided privacy actions.
See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 117, at 802-18 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389-403 (1960). This scheme has been incorporated into the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) Unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another... ; or
(b) Appropriation of the other's name or likeness... ; or
(c) Unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life... ; or
(d) Publicity which unreasonably places the other in a false light.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF ToRTs § 652A (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976).
In the text I make no reference to the "intrusion" aspect of privacy law because I
am here concerned with media publication and reporting and not with the manner in
which the material is gathered. Certainly, it is possible that a reporter may be sub-
jected to a privacy action for the method of investigation as well as for the subsequent
publication. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Pearson v.
Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969); Barber v. Time, Inc.,
159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
2, See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1977);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975); Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248-49 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381, 383
n.7, 384 n.9 (1967).
n See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2 See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975).
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society, may result in unwanted publicity for the person in-
volved. The disclosure may be embarrassing or offensive and
thus infringe on individuality and human dignity. The obvious
question in such a case is which interest-privacy or freedom
of expression-is to prevail.
A. The Public Disclosure Tort Prior to 1974
Almost from the inception of the privacy action of public
disclosure, a "newsworthiness" privilege was recognized that
barred recovery for publication of information in the public
interest. Warren and Brandeis, in their vanguard article, ac-
knowledged the privilege,U and courts, as they accepted the
tort, also recognized the first amendment interest and the
newsworthiness defense.2
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court, following a lead
initiated three years earlier in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,"5 directly applied the first amendment freedoms of
speech and press to privacy actions. Time, Inc. v. Hilly in-
volved a privacy action brought by the plaintiff, James Hill, for
false, but nondefamatory, information about the Hill family
published in defendant's magazine.28 The Supreme Court over-
" Warren and Brandeis, supra note 22, at 214-15.
22 See, e.g., Wagoner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962); Jen-
kins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958);
Thompson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 193 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1952); Sidis v. F-R Publish-
ing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Miller v. National
Broadcasting Co., 157 F. Supp. 240 (D. Del. 1957); Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Berg. v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F.
Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948); Smith v. Doss, 37 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 1948); Barvieri v. News-
Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83
So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Waters v. Fleetwood, 91 S.E.2d 344 (Ga. 1956); Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 1905); Buzinski v. Do-All Co., 175
N.E.2d 577 (ll. App. Ct. 1961); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1929);
Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 98 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951); Martin v. Dorton, 50 So.
2d 391 (Miss. 1951); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 368 P.2d 147 (N.M. 1962);
Schnabel v. Meredith, 107 A.2d 860 (Pa. 1954); Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d
606 (S.C. 1956); Trukes v. Kenco Enterprises, 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963).
2' 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Sullivan Court held that the first amendment required:
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
- 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
21 Life magazine published an account of a play, The Desperate Hours, relating
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turned the judgment for the plaintiffs and remanded the case,
holding that the freedoms of speech and press precluded recov-
ery for false reports of matters of public interest "in the absence
of proof that the defendant published the report with knowl-
edge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth."29 Al-
though Hill was an action based on the publication of false
material," courts were quick to recognize the applicability of
the policy underlying the decision to the publication of truthful
information that was of public interest. Thus the newsworthi-
ness privilege took on constitutional dimensions." The news-
worthiness privilege received added support in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.,32 a libel case in which the Supreme Court
held the knowing or reckless falsity standard applicable to
false, defamatory publications concerning matters of public
interest regardless of the character of the person defamed. If
false, libelous statements concerning matters of public interest
were protected, then, necessarily, the disclosure of similar
truthful material would also be privileged.3 Since the "reckless
disregard of the truth" standard was, by definition, inapplica-
ble to the publication of truthful material, truthful disclosures
were essentially immune from liability. 3
it to an incident in which the Hill family was held hostage by some escaped convicts.
Life described the play as a re-enactment of this incident, and used photographs of
scenes staged in the former Hill home for illustrations. James Hill brought an action
based on a New York privacy statute; he alleged that the article knowingly gave the
false impression that the play was based on the Hill incident. Although on its face the
New York statute, N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976) provided a cause
of action only for commercial use of a person's name or likeness, the New York courts
had interpreted the statute to apply to claims alleging falsification as well. See Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 381-82.
" Id. at 387-88.
' The crux of Hill's claim, however, was based on unwanted public exposure,
regardless of whether the material published was accurate or inaccurate. Id. at 378.
t See, e.g., Man v. Warner Bros., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Cullen v.
Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250
(111. App. Ct. 1970); Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1971); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968);
Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1970).
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Kent v. Pittsburg
Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622, 625-27 (W.D. Pa. 1972), where the Court quoted from
Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom.
I Professor Kalven suggested that the public disclosure tort had been virtually
eliminated by the first amendment privilege. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 326, 336 (1966). However, it
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B. The Trend Toward Media Liability for Public Disclosure
. In 1974 the Supreme Court re-examined the first amend-
ment public interest privilege available to the media in libel
actions. The plaintiff in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc." was a
prominent Chicago attorney who had been defamed in
American Opinion, "a monthly outlet for the views of the John
Birch Society." 6 Although a matter of public interest was in-
volved, the Court rejected the application of the knowing or
reckless falsity standard by the lower courts. A five-Justice
majority retreated from the plurality position in Rosenbloom
and held that the New York Times malice standard was not
constitutionally required when a private individual, such as
Gertz, was defamed." Justice Powell's majority opinion rea-
soned that a private person, unlike a public figure, neither had
access to the media to rebut false statements nor had assumed
the risk of publicity, and therefore "the state interest in pro-
tecting [such individuals was] correspondingly greater.",,
States were invited to apply a negligence standard in the case
of a private plaintiff, whether or not the defamatory statement
involved a matter of public interest. "[S]o long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for them-
should be noted that the media have not entirely escaped liability for undesired public-
ity. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (the publication
of a photograph of plaintiff with her dress blown over her waist was offensive to
community standards of decency); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal.
1971) (although a story concerning truck hijacking was newsworthy, the use of plain-
tiff's name in connection therewith was not necessarily privileged); Melvin v. Reid, 297
P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (the use of plaintiff's true identity without her consent in a
motion picture that was based on her past life of infamy not privileged); Barber v.
Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942) (the disclosure of the identity of plaintiff who
had a rare disease was not newsworthy even if the disease was newsworthy).
31 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
-' Id. at 325. American Opinion ran an article entitled "FRAME-UP: Richard
Nuccio and the War on Police" as part of an effort to warn the public of an imagined
conspiracy to establish a national police force with communist leanings. Nuccio was a
Chicago police officer who had been convicted of second degree murder for the shooting
death of a Chicago youth. In the course of the article, Gertz, who was representing the
dead youth's parents in a civil action against Nuccio, was depicted as being responsible
for framing Nuccio with murder, even though he had only minimal connection with
the criminal proceedings. He was also falsely accused of, among other things, having
a lengthy criminal record and being a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter." Id. at 325-
26.
Id. at 346.
3' Id. at 344-46.
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selves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private indi-
vidual." 9 This holding created the potential for liability based
on inadvertent error, and signaled a decline in first amendment
protection for the media."
1. The Applicability of Gertz to Public Disclosure Actions
Regardless of the ultimate policy underlying the Gertz
opinion,"' the decision holds much significance for privacy liti-
gation. The five-Justice majority exhibited an inclination to
give increased weight to the private interest-in Gertz, per-
sonal reputation-at the expense of protection for the media
and freedom of expression. This was expressed by the major-
ity's willingness to deviate from the established "malice" stan-
dard." Most importantly, the articulated rationale for the new
balance struck in Gertz with reference to libel appears to apply
equally well to public disclosure actions. As noted earlier, the
Court reasoned that since private individuals had not assumed
the risk of media exposure nor had access to the media to rebut
false statements, the state interest in protecting their reputa-
tions was correspondingly greater than in the case of public
persons. 3 Since most public disclosure actions are brought by
private plaintiffs, the first argument-lack of assumption of
the risk-obviously applies.44 Similarly, access to the media is
usually unavailable following the public disclosure of allegedly
private information. Even if access were possible, it would not
provide a remedy; the damage in this sense is irreparable since
" Id. at 347.
40 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
virtually sanctioned recovery when Time's erroneous report that Russell Firestone had
been granted a divorce from his wife on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery was
an honest and entirely reasonable misinterpretation of a cryptic judicial decision. See
also Ashdown, supra note 13, at 673-75.
1 Compare Ashdown, supra note 13, with Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 Tsx. L. Rav. 199 (1976).
2 418 U.S. at 346. For cases using the malice standard, see Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S.
6 (1970); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964).
418 U.S. at 344-46.
" If a privacy action alleging public disclosure of intimate private facts were
brought by a public figure or official, presumably the media defendant would be
entitled to the same constitutional protection available prior to Gertz.
[Vol. 66
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further comment directed toward the unwanted publicity
would only exacerbate the initial disclosure. Thus the Gertz
majority's two rationales for granting protection to private per-
sons-lack of assumed risk and inability to utilize the media
as a remedy-are applicable to public disclosure. 5
Before concluding that the Gertz decision applies with
equal force to the public disclosure tort, it is necessary to com-
pare the.strength of the privacy interest with that of the repu-
tational interest. The Gertz Court spoke of the legitimate state
interest in providing a remedy for defamatory falsehood inju-
rious to reputation. 6 The law of defamation protects a rela-
tional interest-an individual's relationships with others-by
providing a deterrent and a remedy for false, derogatory asper-
sions that are damaging to reputation. Privacy protects a per-
son's relational interest in much the same way, not by protec-
tion from false and unfair statements, but by safeguarding
against penetration and public exposure a sphere of privacy
surrounding the individual. Although the two torts differ with
regard to falsity-the injury in defamation being caused by the
creation of false opinions and in privacy cases due merely to the
publication of factual information-in both cases the damage
is produced by actual and imagined effects on how the plaintiff
is viewed by others." Further, in the case of public exposure of
private information, there may be additional psychic and emo-
tional harm caused by the media disclosure. There is a threat
I C.F. Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values,
20 N.Y.L.F. 453, 480-81 (1975); Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests
And First Amendment Rights In Public Disclosure Cases, 124 PA. L. Ray. 1385, 1404-
05 (1976). Both authors conclude that public disclosure actions are on a parity with
libel actions insofar as the Supreme Court's analysis in Gertz is concerned.
48 418 U.S. at 345-46.
Professors Prosser and Bloustein disagree about whether the interest in reputa-
tion is affected by public disclosure of private information. Prosser believes that it is,
while Bloustein does not. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 978 (1964); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF.
L. Ray. 383, 398 (1960). Although I believe that public disclosure of private information
can affect reputation, I view the primary value protected by both defamation and
privacy law as the broader relational interest, that is, the interest in relationships with
family, friends, associates, and society generally. Professor Bloustein would apparently
agree that public disclosure affects this broad relational interest even though it is not
entirely distinct from, and probably includes, the reputational interest. See Bloustein,
supra, at 979. Sec also A. WasTnN, PRIVACY AND FRmEOM 38-39 (1967); Fried, Privacy,
77 Ytma L. J. 475, 483-85 (1968); Comment, supra note 45, at 1395-98.
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to individuality and an affront to human dignity when a per-
son's private life is made a public spectacle by having the
public become an unwanted witness." In this sense, the injury
is internalized in the form of emotional conflict regarding self-
esteem.
Thus, the interests protected by the public disclosure ac-
tion are seemingly entitled to as much protection as the Su-
preme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. provided for the
reputational interest of a private person. Situations like
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,49 where the plaintiff was
named as a convicted felon, or that of Oliver Sipple, where
Sipple was exposed as a homosexual after thwarting an at-
tempt on the life of President Ford," attest to the fact that
privacy invasions can be just as damaging as defamation. The
state's interest in providing a remedy for such damage should
be equally as great.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the similarity be-
tween libel, as viewed by the Supreme Court in Gertz, and the
privacy action of public disclosure. This relationship suggests
that the same standard-negligence-should be available in a
privacy action brought by a private plaintiff against a pub-
lisher or broadcaster. Even though a public disclosure privacy
claim involves the disclosure of truthful information, the cur-
rent Court's recognition of privacy claims in other contexts,5
coupled with the inclination on the part of a majority of the
Justices to reconsider the balance between the competing in-
terests involved in mass publication torts, 2 forecasts the devel-
opment of media liability in the case of offensive disclosures.
8 WESTIn, supra note 47, at 33; Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitu-
tion: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 Tax. L.
REV. 611, 619 (1968); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amend-
ment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAUP. L. REv. 935, 958-
59 (1968).
4' 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
" N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1975, at 20, col. 1. Sipple filed a $15 million invasion of
privacy suit based on this disclosure.
11 See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 436 U.S. 678 (1977); Sendak v. Arnold,
429 U.S. 6968 (1976) (summary affirmance); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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2. Limitations on Liability: Cox Broadcasting
Before examining the form of a potential standard of lia-
bility, it is necessary to consider the impact of Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn,53 which retained for the media an absolute
privilege to publish facts appearing in public records. Cox
Broadcasting involved an invasion of privacy action brought by
the father of a rape victim for the disclosure of his daughter's
name on a television news report. The disclosure was made in
violation of a Georgia statute that prohibited the disclosure of
a rape victim's identity." The defendants admitted making the
broadcasts but claimed the reports were privileged under both
state law and the first and fourteenth amendments. The trial
court rejected these constitutional claims and held that the
Georgia statute provided a civil remedy for its violation. The
plaintiff was granted summary judgment on the issue of liabil-
ity.55
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in concluding that the statute provided a civil cause
of action, but went on to rule that the complaint stated a cause
of action "for the invasion of the appellee's right of privacy, or
for the tort of public disclosure."5" The father was held to have
stated a claim for invasion of his privacy because of the broad-
cast of his daughter's name. Although the Georgia Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court that the first and fourteenth
amendments did not protect the station as a matter of law,
summary judgment was held to be improper since the plaintiff
would need to prove that "the appellants invaded his privacy
with wilfull or negligent disregard for the fact that reasonable
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
51 It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print
and publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium
of public dissemination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast,
televised, or disseminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or other
publication published in this State or through any radio or television broad-
cast originating in the State the name or identity of any female who may
have been raped or upon whom an assault with intent to commit rape may
have been made. Any person or corporation violating the provisions of this
section shall, upon conviction, be punished as for a misdemeanor.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1977).
" 420 U.S. at 474.
- 200 S.E.2d 127, 130 (Ga. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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men would find the invasion highly offensive."5 On rehearing,
the court upheld the constitutionality of the anti-disclosure
statute and concluded that it was an authoritative declaration
that, as a matter of state policy, a rape victim's name was not
a matter of public interest or concern."
Although speaking favorably of the right to privacy, 9 the
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that states
may not impose sanctions on the accurate publication of infor-
mation contained in judicial records open to public inspec-
tion."0 The narrowness of the holding in Cox Broadcasting is
apparent upon consideration of the extent of its applicability.
Information appearing in public records, to which the decision
apparently applies,"1 is limited. Discounting relatively insignif-
icant public records containing esoteric information, the major
public recordations are of police and judicial proceedings (as in
Cox Broadcasting), real estate transactions, births, deaths, and
issuances of licenses and permits. These records represent a
minor portion of the total body of information capable of pro-
ducing undesired publicity.
Although Cox Broadcasting was certainly an important
recognition of first amendment interests, the Court expressly
refused to answer the broad question of whether truthful publi-
cations may ever be the basis of liability.12 Several factors un-
derlying Cox Broadcasting, in addition to the implications of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,"3 indicate that when the Supreme
Court directly confronts this issue, a negligence-oriented stan-
dard will result.
The first and most obvious sign which supports this prog-
nosis is the pro-privacy language used by Justice White, writ-
ing for the majority in Cox Broadcasting:
37 Id. at 131.
Id. at 134.
420 U.S. at 488-89.
,o Id. at 491.
Although the precise holding of Cox Broadcasting applies to judicial records, the
Court spoke several times in broader language, referring to "official records" and
"public records." Id. at 492, 495. Certainly the Court's rationale-the importance of
the news media in reporting on governmental operations if official records are the basic
data of those operations-applies to all public records and documents. Id. at 492.
92 Id. at 491.
1' See text accompanying notes 35-52 supra for a discussion of these implications.
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[P]owerful arguments can be made, and have been made,
that however it may be ultimatey defined, there is a zone of
privacy surrounding every individual, a zone within which
the State may protect him from intrusion by the press, with
all its attendant publicity."'
After referring to the Warren and Brandeis article, 5 he pointed
out that "the century has experienced a strong tide running in
favor of the so-called right of privacy," and suggested that
there were "impressive credentials" for such a right."6 The
opinion then noted that although Time, Inc. v. Hill had
"expressly saved the question whether truthful publication of
very private matters unrelated to public affairs could be consti-
tutionally proscribed," the Court intended to proceed with cau-
tion. 7 In so doing, the majority expressly declined to consider
the broad doctrinal issue, deciding the case instead on the nar-
row ground of a media privilege to publish or broadcast matters
of public record. Nevertheless, the Court indicated its receptiv-
ity to invasion of privacy claims and signaled that it might take
a pro-privacy position when the broad question of media liabil-
ity for public disclosure of private facts is confronted."8
Another factor which suggests the development of liability
for truthful publications emerges from the realization that the
Supreme Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting was virtually
dictated by precedent. Justice White cited the Warren and
Brandeis privacy article, Tentative Draft No. 13 of the Second
Restatement of Torts, Prosser, and nine cases for the common
law proposition that publication of information derived from
official records is privileged. 9 Thus, even had the Court wanted
to sanction the viability of a public disclosure action, the ma-
jority would have had to counter a substantial body of preced-
ent. The Court may well have chosen to follow the most effica-
cious path by recognizing the established precedent and decid-
" 420 U.S. at 487.
"Id. at 487. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 22.
420 U.S. at 488-89.
Id. at 491. The Court's cautious approach to the interface between privacy and
freedom of expression is another indication of the present Court's inclination to bal-
ance carefully these two conflicting interests. This suggests that the privacy interest
will fare better than it has in the past.
"Id.
,1 Id. at 493, 494 n.25.
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ing the case on the narrow ground. It thereby preserved the
larger question of whether a remedy exists for public disclosure
for a future case where an effort to sanction recovery would not
run head-on into settled doctrine.
3. The Emerging Policy Regarding Press Freedom
Recognition of a media privilege to publish information
contained in public records coincides with the current Supreme
Court's philosophy of freedom of the press. The Court's most
recent libel decisions, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.7" and Time,
Inc. v. Firestone,7 evince a policy to restrict unencumbered
media reporting to matters at the core of self-government, that
is, material with potential political significance.72
This intention to limit protected media coverage to infor-
mation with sociopolitical impact can best be seen in the
Court's private versus public figure dichotomy. In Gertz, the
Court permitted private persons to recover for the negligent
publication of libelous statements, while it retained the know-
ing or reckless falsity standard of New York Times v. Sullivan
for public persons.3 Thus, the press is adequately protected
against libel judgments only in the case of publications or
broadcasts concerning public officials or figures. The immedi-
ate political relevance of information about public officials is
obvious, and the Court has defined "public figure" as a person
who has present or potential political impact. The Court's lat-
est libel decision, Time, Inc., v. Firestone, when dealing with
the public figure question, focused on language from Gertz that
emphasized the individual's influence on public questions:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some
occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that
they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves
70 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
71 See Ashdown, supra note 13, at 672-90. See also Bezanson, The New Free Press
Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977).
" See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra where the Court's establishment of
this double standard is discussed.
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to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved.74
This dual-level test for determining whether a plaintiff is a
public figure-occupying a position of persuasive power and
influence or attempting to influence the resolution of a public
issue-demonstrates the Supreme Court's intent to restrict
media protection from libel claims to material at the heart of
freedom of expression.
Cox Broadcasting is consistent with this policy. The
Court's rationale for protecting the accurate disclosure of infor-
mation contained in official records was based on the responsi-
bility of the news media to fully inform the public of govern-
mental operations, the basic data of which are official records
and documents.75 Without question, reports of the proceedings
of government are at the core of self-government and are of
maximum political relevance, for "[w]ithout the information
provided by the press most of us and many of our representa-
tives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opin-
ions on the administration of government generally."76
On the other hand, most public disclosures of information
not obtained from public records will fail to have apparent
political significance. For example, an article about a former
child prodigy,77 publicity concerning the relatives of a person
of public interest,78 a story about two children who suffocated
in a refrigerator,7 or exposure of the unusual private life of a
surfer80 carry little, if any, immediate political impact. Al-
though the aggregate of such information may be "needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period,"8 the Supreme Court may view this
material as directed merely toward reader interest and curios-
ity, and not as the kind of information which is essential to
7' 424 U.S. at 453 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345).
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
' Id. at 492.
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940).
7' See Smith v. Doss, 37 So.2d 118 (Ala. 1948); Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
273 A.2d 899, 918 (Pa. 1971).
" Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1970).
" Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
" Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
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enable persons to govern themselves effectively. Such disclo-
sures would then be entitled to less protection than politically
influential matter, opening the way to media liability based on
carelessness and insensitivity.
It appears probable that Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
represents the Court's concession to the media in public disclo-
sure cases. Given the Court's view of the appropriate balance
to be struck between private rights and freedom of expression,
it is likely that Cox Broadcasting signifies the media side of this
balance. The accurate publication of information taken from
public records will be protected, but the press is likely to find
itself saddled with potential liability in all other cases of un-
wanted public exposure.
C. A Potential Standard for Media Liability
Assuming the accurate portrayal of this trend, the remain-
ing consideration is the standard which the Supreme Court will
adopt to test media liability. Although both case law gener-
ally12 and the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz seem to point
toward a standard based on negligence, in the case of truthful
publications a negligence-offensiveness approach would have
" Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In the Georgia Supreme
Court's opinion in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1973), reu'd,
420 U.S. 469 (1975), the standard for media liability was whether there was "wilful or
negligent disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the invasion highly
offensive." Id. at 131. In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971), the
court held that a plaintiff could recover in a public disclosure action when he could
prove "that the publisher invaded his privacy with reckless disregard for the fact that
reasonable men would find the invasion highly offensive." Id. at 44.
See also Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940), where, although denying recovery on the facts before it, the court
indicated that "[r]evelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the
victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency." Id. at 809. This
standard was cited by the United States Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 383 n.7 (1967), when discussing the possibility of imposing liability on truthful
publications. Professor Alfred Hill favors use of this "Sidis principle" to test media
liability for unwanted publicity. Hill, Defamation And Privacy Under The First
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. Rav. 1205, 1258-69 (1976).
In addition to the cases mentioned above, Professor Hill believes that the occa-
sional judicial pronouncements that liability may be predicated on unreasonable pub-
licity which is not newsworthy or of legitimate public interest are consistent with Sidis.
He also believes that these formulations are often combined with language that sug-
gests that the Sidis unconscionability standard is really being applied. Id. at 1261-62,
nn. 267, 268, 271.
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to be combined with some form of public interest test. Even
though the Court in Gertz dispensed with the concept of public
interest as an exclusive benchmark of media liability, the pub-
lications there involved were false and defamatory. Where the
published statements are truthful and accurate, the public
need for and interest in the material is greater. However, the
broad public interest concept of Time, Inc. v. Hill83 would leave
present media immunity intact. Gertz, Firestone, and Cox
Broadcasting have signaled a desire to narrow the public inter-
est concept to encompass only material relevant to self-
government. 4 Public disclosures within this strict delineation
of newsworthiness will be protected, but those outside this
realm which are offensive to the reasonable person or to notions
of common decency may be subject to liability in the future.
In other words, what may be expected in the area of unwanted
public exposure is a standard of media liability based on (1)
whether the disclosure is of "legitimate public interest," i.e.,
material with sociopolitical importance relevant to self-
governance; if it is not, (2) whether the disclosure is unreason-
able and offensive to common standards of decency."
In Hill, the Court spoke of the public interest as "embrac[ing] all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope
with exigencies of their period." 385 U.S. at 388 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 102 (1940)), and stated that "[tihe line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [freedom of the press]." Id. (quoting
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
" See text accompanying notes 70.81 supra for the development of this trend. The
Court apparently intends to provide complete protection only to material with poten-
tial political impact.
" See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. 1971); Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 131 (Ga. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
" See Bloustein, supra note 1, at 56-65. Professor Bloustein favors the application
of the Meiklejohn theory of freedom of expression to the public disclosure situation.
Under Professor Meiklejohn's analysis, information needed to facilitate the public's
self-governing function would be absolutely privileged. Material unnecessary for fulfill-
ment of the governing function and directed only to reader interest and curiosity would
be subject to regulation under a fifth amendment due process-reasonableness ap-
proach. Id. Presumably, under the fifth amendment, the states would be free to impose
liability on the press if the standard employed were reasonable. This is very similar to
the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974), in regard to defamation. See also Beytagh, supra note 45, at 498-500.
Professor Beytagh would permit:
recovery of actual damages in a privacy action where there has been an
unconsented-to public disclosure of information that an individual might
reasonably desire to keep confidential, where that information is irrelevant
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As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has recognized infor-
mation contained in public records to be relevant to the govern-
ing function of the public and has provided the press with
immunity for its dissemination. 7 Other than official records
and disclosures about public officials and figures," it is difficult
to isolate material which serves a governing purpose. Reports
concerning ostensibly private persons involved in public issues
might be one example89 and information regarding crime an-
other, but outside these areas the connection between a partic-
ular disclosure and the public's governing function may be
hard to establish. 0
It has been suggested that unless a person is in a position
to affect the lives of others, and therefore of sociopolitical inter-
est, his identity should not be revealed by the media in connec-
tion with a potentially embarrassing story,9' even if the story
itself is of sociopolitical relevance.12 The name of the individual
to any legitimate media reflection of the public interest in the dissemination
of newsworthy matter and is offensive to ordinary sensibilities.
Id. at 499. In Comment, supra note 45, at 1411-16, the author suggests that the press
might incur liability for disclosures of "core privacy interests" (sexual activities,
health, distant past) unless the court determines that the information is of "legitimate
public interest." This standard approaches the problem in reverse, but the determina-
tion-legitimate public interest and offensiveness-is essentially the same.
A test similar to the one mentioned in the text was also suggested in Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971), where the court stated that "a truthful
publication is constitutionally protected if (1) it is newsworthy, and (2) it does not
reveal facts so offensive as to shock the community's notions of decency." Id. at 42-
43. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976).
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
See text accompanying note 74 supra for a discussion of "public figure." Public
officials have the ability to affect directly public decisions; public figures have the
power to affect indirectly those decisions through the influence they exert.
11 The definition of public figure which the Supreme Court adopted in Gertz and
Firestone included persons who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
,o For example, in the archetypal case of Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940), it is difficult to characterize the
disclosure of the unproductive life of a former child prodigy as information relevant to
a governing purpose. See also the text accompanying notes 78-80 supra for other similar
cases.
" See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 300 S.E.2d 127, 133-34 (Ga. 1973), reo'd,
420 U.S. 469 (1974); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 40 (Cal. 1971);
Beytagh, supra note 45, at 498-99; Nimmer, supra note 48, at 962.
,1 See Bloustein, supra note 1, at 58-61.
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involved is said to serve no additional informative function
which is essential to self-government. It is the event that is
newsworthy, not the individual. Regardless of whether one be-
lieves that the story of the wasted genius of a child prodigy is
important, it can be forcefully contended that the identifica-
tion of the squanderer is unnecessary to the lesson. Similarly,
although reports about past criminal acts are of legitimate
public interest,93 it may be that the naming of the former felon
serves no additional public purpose. 4 Once the encounter with
the criminal process has ended, identification of the ex-
offender will not aid the administration of justice. Exposure
and identification interfere with the goal of rehabilitation, and,
it may be argued, serve no public interest other than to satisfy
reader curiosity. Even under a broad concept of public inter-
est, at least one court has taken the position that although a
story may have some news value, the identity of the person
involved does not." Certainly, under a restricted version of
11 As stated by the Supreme Court of California in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n., 483 P.2d 34, 39-40 (Cal. 1971):
We have no doubt that reports of the facts of past crimes are newswor-
thy. Media publication of the circumstances under which crimes were com-
mitted in the past may prove educational in the same way that reports of
current crimes do. The public has a strong interest in enforcing the law, and
this interest is served by accumulating and disseminating data cataloguing
the reasons men commit crimes, the methods they use, and the ways in
which they are apprehended.
94 I refer here to the identification of persons as past criminals, i.e., those who have
committed a crime a number of years earlier. Identification of adults currently charged
with the commission of a crime serves the public interest by putting others on notice
that the named individual is suspected of having committed a crime and by encourag-
ing eye witnesses and character witnesses to testify.
,1 See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid,
297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). But see, Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d
773 (Del. 1963); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1970), both denying recovery
for such a disclosure. It appears that the question of liability for disclosure of past
criminal acts may have been settled by Cox Broadcasting. Since information regarding
former crimes is a matter of public record, presumably publication of such material is
protected. It may be that the Court meant to draw no lines in the area of public records
and therefore the disclosure of any information contained therein is protected. This,
however, ignores the fact that the disclosure of the identity of a person who has
committed a crime many years earlier serves no apparent governing function, and thus
is antithetical to the Supreme Court's rationale in Cox Broadcasting. The Cox
Broadcasting majority failed to deal adequately with the situation created by the
disclosure of stale information unrelated to governmental operations. This issue will
have to await further adjudication.
" Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942) (the name and photograph of
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public interest which limits newsworthiness to material rele-
vant to the self-governing process, the identification of individ-
uals has even less significance.
Even if a news item necessitates the identification of the
person involved, an unnecessary, embarrassing, and offensive
disclosure accompanying the story may be irrelevant to the
governing function of the reading public. For example, is it
important to disclose that a person responsible for thwarting an
assassination attempt on the President of the United States is
a homosexual?97 Similarly, in a news article about body surf-
ing and the proficiency of a particular participant, it may be
unnecessary to expose bizarre incidents in the subject's life. 8
D. The Thi'eat to Freedom of Expression
Closely examined, however, the foregoing cases illustrate
the problem created by attempting to impose liability on the
media for alleged privacy invasions. The press is already ex-
posed to liability for defamation.9 Any effort to subject the
media to privacy liability where the published material is
truthful and accurate is likely to prove much more devastating
to freedom of expression. The basis of liability in a libel action
brought by a private person-a negligent failure to discover
inaccuracy-is something relatively ascertainable by a pub-
lisher or broadcaster through investigation. However, in the
case of public disclosure, where liability is not based on truth
or falsity but on the nebulous concepts of sociopolitical relev-
ance and offensiveness, the chilling effect on publication will
be severe. Even if certain types of information can be isolated
as being generally offensive and embarrasing to reasonable per-
a woman suffering from an unusual disease was not in the public interest). See also
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1973); Hunter v. Washington
Post, 102 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 1561 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1974) (both cases holding the
publication of the name of a rape victim not to be in the public interest). In addition,
three states other than Georgia have statutes prohibiting such disclosures. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 794.03, 794.04 (West 1965 & Supp. 1974-75); S.C. CODE § 16-81 (1962);
Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (West 1958). These later cases and statutes are constitution-
ally invalid in light of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
" See N. Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1975, at 20, col. 1.
Is See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998 (1976).
" See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
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sons,' ® and therefore recognizable as such by a potential pub-
lisher, the real problem lies in determining what information
is of legitimate public interest in terms of relevance to the self-
governing function. It is probable that much accurate material,
relevant to self-government, will be voluntarily suppressed by
the media to avoid the risk of litigation and judgments for
unwanted publicity.
For example, in Virgil v. Time, Inc.,101 Sports Illustrated
ran an article about body surfing and the daring nature of body
surfer Ron Virgil. The complained-of segments of the story
mentioned bizarre and masochistic incidents in Virgil's life
(extinguishing lighted cigarettes on his body and diving head
first down a flight of stairs). Such disclosures are important to
the self-governing process because they reveal personality char-
acteristics which may lead to a particular type of physical or
mental behavior. Regarding Oliver Sipple, the ex-marine who
saved former President Gerald Ford from an attempted assassi-
nation, the disclosure of Sipple's homosexuality is certainly
information with social and political significance; it exposes
readers to a factual account of the behavior of a homosexual
which is contrary to some popular views regarding homosex-
uals. Such information may have a moderating effect on public
attitudes toward homosexuals-a group which has been subject
to both social and legal persecution. Yet regarding both Virgil
and Sipple, it is unlikely that the disclosure would have been
made were it subject to a later judicial determination regarding
its importance to the public's self-governing function. The lack
of certainty and predictability engendered by such a standard
would limit personal disclosures to matters involving public
officials, the only group unquestionably of public interest.
Additionally, one can presume that under a standard of
relevance, the press would not risk identifying the individual
involved in a potentially embarrassing and objectionable story
unless the person were a government official or otherwise had
potential political impact."' Only then could a publisher or
"' See Comment, supra note 45, at 1411 (1976), in which the author characterizes
information regarding sexual activities, health, and the distant past as involving "core
privacy interests" which the press should reasonably know an individual desires to
keep private.
"' 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
20 See note 74 and accompanying text supra for the definition of "public figure"
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broadcaster be certain that the disclosure would be related to
an informative purpose. Such a restricted state of "press free-
dom" would not only reduce the number and kind of individu-
als about whom information would be available, it would also
reduce story impact. If a publisher were unsure of the capacity
of his subject to affect public affairs or public decisions, the
entire story, ' or at least the identity of the person involved,
would surely be withheld. This decision would eliminate from
public consideration information about many individuals some
of whom may be in a position to affect the public interest and
the lives of others. '"4 Furthermore, an article or news item pub-
lished without disclosing the names of the participants would
lose much of its impact and ieliability in the eyes of the reader.
Reader interest would consequently be diminished. The read-
ing and listening public is interested in information about "real
live people," and without such material a portion of the audi-
ence is likely to "tune-out." Thus, even if the story itself, with-
out the names of those involved, is of governing significance, a
percentage of the public will not be exposed to it because of its
lack of readability. As a result, freedom of the press will not
have fulfilled its function, and freedom of expression and self-
government will be the ultimate losers.
There is no doubt that certain disclosures that name indi-
viduals are embarrassing and offensive and result in unwanted
publicity. It may even be that in some cases publishers realize
that good taste and propriety suggest withholding stories or
names, but nevertheless use a personalized treatment as a tool
to sell the information involved. This is one of those sensitive
areas where two libertarian values both demand recognition,
and where the result of the conflict must depend on the relative
significance accorded the competing interests. Although pro-
tection from the public disclosure of private information is an
understandable desire, freedom of expression under the first
amendment is a much more compelling interest considering its
pervasive impact on society and on our sociopolitical system.
adopted by the Supreme Court.
10 If the identity of the pivotal figure in a news story cannot be disclosed for fear
of privacy liability, the story may not be worth publishing.
"0I Examples include teachers, school officials, religious leaders, little-known ac-
tors, literary figures, business people and industrialists.
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Hopefully, the private right will continue to yield to the public
interest. However, recent Supreme Court decisions regarding
mass publication torts indicate that such may not be the case.
II. FALSIFICATION
The Supreme Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill'1 5 sub-
stantially protected the press from privacy actions which al-
leged the publication of false, but nondefamatory,"' state-
ments. In Hill, the Court held that a plaintiff was not entitled
to "redress [for] false reports of matters of public interest"
unless it could be shown "that the defendant published the
report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of
the truth." ' 7 It would seem, however, that Hill was implicitly
overruled by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.' in which the Court
moved the focus of the constitutional privilege away from the
concept of public interest back to the character of the party
defamed and sanctioned the use of a negligence standard in the
case of private individuals.
Since the torts of defamation and of invasion of privacy by
means of false statements have received identical treatment
with respect to constitutional protection for media defen-
dants,0 9 it appears that the states are now free, in light of
Gertz, to impose a negligence standard for false reports about
private individuals, with the knowing or reckless falsity stan-
dard remaining applicable in the case of public plaintiffs.110
The only thing which might militate against this conclusion
would be the view that a person's privacy interest in preventing
and redressing the publication of false statements about him-
self is not as significant as his interest in reputation. However,
close examination reveals three distinct kinds of harm created
"- 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
IN If the statements about the plaintiff are both false and disparaging, the correct
action is defamation and not the privacy action of falsification. The plaintiff should
not be able to skirt the requirements for defamation by giving his action a "privacy"
label. See RESTATEMEN (SECoND) oF ToRTS § 652E, Comment e. (Tent. Draft No. 22,
1976).
" 385 U.S. at 387-88.
U 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" Compare Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) and New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), with Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
"U Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
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by the publication of false statements, all of which overlap with
the relational-reputational interest in varying degrees, thus
indicating the propriety of applying similar standards of liabil-
ity.
First, many false publications are derogatory and humili-
ating, and therefore do actually injure reputation. An excellent
example is Berry v. National Broadcasting Co."' in which the
NBC news program "First Tuesday" depicted the plaintiff,
who had been acquitted of the murder of an Indian, as being
the beneficiary of a double standard of justice. If this type of
report can be established as false, it is certainly defamatory as
well since it suggests that the subject may have been guilty of
homicide."2 It is irrefutable that the constitutional principles
applicable to defamation will apply to this class of case. '
Second, there are inaccuracies which, although noninju-
rious to reputation, are offensive because they are misleading.
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc."' provides an example. In a
purported biography, The Warren Spahn Story, the author
manufactured various aspects of the major league pitcher's re-
lationship with his father, falsely depicted Spahn as a war hero,
fictionalized his courtship and marriage, invented dialogue,
and indulged in a fanciful exposure of Spahn's inner thoughts.
Although none of this material was disparaging, this type of
publication injured the subject's relational interests (his rela-
1' 480 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1973).
,12 For other "false light" cases which are also defamatory, see Cantrell v. Forest
City Publishing Co., 484 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (inaccura-
cies and untruths which unfairly portrayed the plaintiffs as untidy and poor); Varnish
v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
987 (1969) (article in The National Enquirer implied that the plaintiff-husband was
insensitive and lacked care and understanding for his wife who had killed their three
children and herself); Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951)
(child unfairly portrayed as careless pedestrian); Strickler v. NBC, 167 F. Supp. 68
(S.D. Cal. 1958) (defendant's dramatized version of an emergency aboard a commer-
cial airliner presented a commander in the United States Navy in a fashion unfavora-
ble and embarrassing to him); Goldberg v. Ideal Publishing Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 938
(App. Div. 1960) (views on sexual freedom falsely ascribed to plaintiff-rabbi); Bennett
v. Norban, 151 A.2d 476 (Pa. 1959) (plaintiff wrongfully accused of shoplifting, al-
though case is somewhat unclear as to privacy theory on which plaintiff was proceed-
ing).
" See Nimmer, supra note 48, at 964-65. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
TORTS § 652E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
"1 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964), affl'd, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div. 1965),
affl'd, 211 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 239 (1967).
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tionship with family, friends, acquaintances, and society gen-
erally) by creating an inaccurate perception in the mind of the
reader.115 In addition, such fictionalization invades privacy by
purporting to enter the sphere of privacy that surrounds the
individual, and in this sense can create internal psychic harm.
The final form of falsification is offensive not because it is
false, but simply because it invades the plaintiff's solitude. In
this sense, it is identical to public disclosure of private informa-
tion. For instance, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, "I even though the
information was false, there would have been no less harm to
the Hill family had the information in the Life magazine article
been true. After being held hostage by escaped convicts in their
Pennsylvania home, the family had moved to Connecticut to
escape the public spotlight. James Hill's complaint was
grounded on the intrusion into their newly acquired privacy,
and not on the fictionalization contained in the Life article. 7
As such, this form of "false light" case, in addition to causing
internal mental distress, affects the relational interest by ex-
posing the subject to public scrutiny."1
Even though the latter two forms of falsification do not
directly injure reputation,1 they are closely related and poten-
I See also Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1955) (plaintiff listed as one of "thousands of leading law firms" using de-
fendant's machines, when actually the plaintiff had returned the machine as unsatis-
factory); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., Inc., 113 P.2d 438 (Ore. 1941) (plaintiff's name
signed to political telegram without his consent); Dattaglia v. Adams, 164 So.2d 195
(Fla. 1964), (right to privacy prevents unauthorized use of presidential candidate's
name on primary ballot).
"' 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
I Since Hill chose to sue in the New York courts under §§ 50-51 of the N.Y. Cirv.
RIGrs LAw, he was forced to rely on the fictionalized aspects of the Life article.
Although "Right of Privacy" is the caption of §§ 50-51, the text of the statute only
covers the commercial appropriation of a person's name, portrait, or picture without
consent. Prior to the Hill action, however, the New York courts had construed the
statute to apply to falsification as well. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 211 N.E.2d
543, 545 (1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 239 (1967) and the New York cases
cited by the Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384-85 n.9 (1967).
"8 See text accompanying notes 47-50, supra, where this interest is discussed with
respect to the public disclosure test.
M' Some commentators have, however, viewed the falsity situation as virtually
indistinguishable from defamation. See Prosser, supra note 14, at 398-401; Kalven,
supra note 34, at 340. If the Supreme Court adopts this view of falsification, which it
may have done in Zacchini, see note 121 infra, then Gertz would clearly dictate the
result in future false light cases.
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tially just as injurious since both relational and privacy inter-
ests suffer from such publications. Consequently, the analysis
and holding of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. applies to the
privacy-falsification tort regardless of the form it takes. The
Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, likened the
"false light" situation to defamation, 2 ' and there is no reason
to suspect that the Burger Court will do otherwise. 2' In fact,
by granting certiorari in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing
Co., ,22 a "false light" case, ' 23 at least four Justices were appar-
ently ready to conform Hill to Gertz. However, during consider-
ation of the case, the Court evidently became aware that it was
unnecessary and superfluous to change the constitutional stan-
dard in order to grant the particular relief sought. The plaintiff
had not objected to the knowing or reckless falsity instruction
given by the district judge, ,24 and was complaining only of the
,I" In Hill, the Supreme Court applied the N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan libel
standard to privacy-falsification, stating:
We find applicable here the standard of knowing or reckless falsehood,
not through blind application of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, relating
solely to libel actions by public officials, but only upon consideration of the
factors which arise in the particular context of the application of the New
York statute in cases involving private individuals. This is neither a libel
action by a private individual nor a statutory action by a public official.
Therefore, although the First Amendment principles pronounced in New
York Times guide our conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying
these principles in this discrete context.
385 U.S. at 390-91 (1966).
,2I n Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), when
comparing falsification to the appropriation of the right to publicity, the Supreme
Court stated that "[tihe interest protected in permitting recovery for placing the
plaintiff in a false light is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental
distress as in defamation." Id. at 573.
[- 419 U.S. 245 (1974). The Cantrell action was based on an article appearing in
the Sunday Magazine of defendant's newspaper, the Cleveland Plain Dealer. The story
dealt with the aftermath of a bridge disaster in which Margaret Cantrell's husband,
Melvin, was among 44 persons killed. The article was intended to illustrate the impact
of the bridge collapse on the lives of the people in the area, and it portrayed the
Cantrells as destitute and despondent. The story contained inaccuracies and fabrica-
tions, the most prominent of which was the allegation that Mrs. Cantrell, during the
reporter's visit to her home, had been wearing the same mask of non-expression she
wore [at her husband's] funeral." Id. at 248.
"I Cantrell can also be viewed as a public disclosure case. Although the defen-
dant's article contained inaccuracies and untruths, the gravamen of the action ap-
peared to lie in the exposure of the Cantrells' life style, living arrangements, and
emotional state.
"I Id. at 249-50.
MEDIA REPORTING AND PRIVACY
court of appeals' reversal of the judgment that had been won
under that standard. Consequently, after stating that it was
not presented with the question of the continued validity of
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 15 the Court examined the case in terms of
the Hill test, and concluded that the district judge had cor-
rectly interpreted and applied the knowing or reckless falsity
standard.' The case was therefore remanded to the court of
appeals with directions for it to enter a judgment affirming the
district court. It appears that the Supreme Court's handling of
Cantrell was dictated by expedience and procedure, rather
than the failure of a majority of the Justices to agree on the
substantive issue involved.12s Thus, while the Gertz analysis
and holding have yet to be applied to privacy-falsification
cases, such an application can be anticipated.
I. APPROPRIATION-THE "RIGHT To Pusicry"
Since its origin, the tort for wrongful appropriation of one's
name or likeness has been given a privacy label.12 Although the
tort does occasionally protect a privacy interest,129 its primary
"I The Court did, however, cite Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. for the proposition
that the continued vitality of Time, Inc. v. Hill was in doubt. Id. at 250-51.
12 Id. at 251-53.
"I Compare Cantrell with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in
which petitioner Elmer Gertz, after losing in the lower courts based on an application
of the N. Y Times malice test, directly confronted the Supreme Court with the contin-
ued validity of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). With the record
in such a posture, the case was ripe for the rejection of Rosenbloom in order to grant
petitioner Gertz the desired relief.
'" W. PROssER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, (1960). Note also that the New York statute permitting recovery
for the unauthorized use of a person's picture for commercial purposes is captioned
"Right of Privacy." N. Y. Civ. RIoHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976). For a discussion
of proposed changes in the New York statute, see Greenwalt, New York's Right of
Privacy-The Need for Change, 42 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 159 (1975).
I" The unauthorized use of the name or likeness of a private individual is objec-
tionable primarily because it invades the subject's privacy. The injury is psychological
in nature and is produced by exposure and embarrassment. E.g., Roberson v. Roches-
ter Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (use of plaintiff's likeness to advertise
defendant's flour); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905)
(plaintiff's photograph used to advertise defendant's insurance.)
It has been suggested that the New York "appropriation" statute, enacted one
year after the Roberson decision, was intended to provide protection for this privacy
interest. See Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
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function has been to provide a remedy for the misappropriation
of a proprietary interest involving the "right to publicity."'3
Appropriation cases customarily involve the unapproved use of
a public personality's name or likeness for some trade or com-
mercial purpose. In such a case, the plaintiff complains not of
a privacy invasion, but objects to the commercial exploitation
of his identity, something which has pecuniary value. Since
appropriation actions usually take this form, they have only
occasionally involved media defendants and the first amend-
ment privilege.''
A. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
The first case on record directly to consider the conflict
between the public's "right to know" and the individual's
"right to publicity" in the context of a news presentation was
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.'32 In 1972 Hugo
Zacchini was performing his "human cannonball" act at the
Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. A free lance reporter for
the Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company attended the fair
130 The unauthorized use of the name or likeness of a public figure for commercial
benefit involves no invasion of privacy because the person is already "public," and thus
has waived his or her right to be free of publicity. In addition, it is unlikely that a
celebrity suffers embarrassment or humiliation from the additional exposure. Such an
unapproved use does, however, involve the misappropriation of a pecuniary inter-
est-the right of a public personality to commercially utilize his fame. A number of
courts have recognized the distinction between invasion of privacy and this latter
proprietary claim. See, e.g., Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) (first court to characterize the
interest as the "right to publicity"); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.
Minn. 1970); Price v. Hall Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. 1972);
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc.,232 A.2d 458 (N.J. 1967). See also Nimmer, The
Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 222 (1954); Comment, The Right of
Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527,
528-39 (1976); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652C, comment at 17 (Tent. Draft
No. 22, 1976).
PI See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (unauthorized use
of photograph of Cary Grant by Esquire Magazine); Man v. Warner Bros., Inc., 317
F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (motion picture of rock music festival); Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952) (television halftime of professional football
game); Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 337 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (interview
with Elvis Presley included on a phonograph record). All of these cases involved alleged
commercial exploitation by a media defendant.
132 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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carrying a movie camera. Zacchini asked that his act not be
filmed, and the reporter acquiesced at that time. However, the
reporter returned the following day and videotaped a fifteen-
second film clip of the performer's feat, which was aired during
a newscast on defendant's television station that evening. Zac-
chini then brought an action for damages alleging "an
'unlawful appropriation of [his] professional property'." After
summary judgment for defendant in the trial court, the Ohio
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the "complaint stated
a cause of action for conversion and for infringement of a com-
mon law copyright," and that the first amendment provided no
defense to the taking of the plaintiff's property.'33
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed with the court of ap-
peals' characterization of the action as one of conversion and
infringement of a common law copyright,'34 and instead
grounded Zacchini's claim on appropriation of his right to pub-
licity. Although it concluded that this proprietary interest was
entitled to legal protection, 35 the court held that the first
amendment provided a privilege to broadcast matters of legiti-
mate public interest unless the actual intent was to appropri-
ate the performance for some private use or to injure the per-
former.3 ' The court determined that no such intent was shown
and that the performance in question was clearly a matter of
legitimate public interest and reversed the court of appeals. In
response to the plaintiff's argument that the telecast infringed
his rights by showing his entire performance, the court stated
that it could formulate no fixed standard based on the quantity
of material presented without unduly restricting the
"breathing room" which freedom of the press required.'37
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. After strain-
ing somewhat to reach the first amendment issue,'38 the Court
I" Id. at 564.
Ju 351 N.E.2d 454, 456-57 (Ohio 1976).
lu Id. at 458-60.
lu Id. at 461.
137 Id.
121 The Supreme Court concluded that the first amendment was an issue because
the Ohio Supreme Court had based its opinion on the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting and applying the first amendment. 433 U.S. at 566-68.
Although it is clear that the Ohio Supreme Court's consideration of the privilege
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analogized the claim to those based on copyright and patent
law and held that the first amendment did not protect respon-
dent's broadcast of petitioner's "entire act."" 9
Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn be-
tween media reports that are protected and those that are
not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments'do not immunize the media when they broadcast a
performer's entire act without his consent."'
B. The Distinction Between Falsification and Appropriation
The error made by the Ohio Supreme Court was not its
interpretation and application of Time, Inc. v. Hill to the pub-
licity case before it; the mistake was rather in its reliance on
Hill at all, a decision apparently discredited by Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc."' and Time, Inc. v. Firestone."' Although Justice
White's majority opinion in Zacchini did not openly indicate
any disenchantment with Hill, it distinguished that case in an
unconvincing style. First, the majority noted that the state's
interests in providing a cause of action in "false light" cases,
such as Hill, were different from those involved in "right of
publicity" cases. Justice White wrote that "'[t]he interest
protected' in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a
false light 'is clearly that of reputation, with the same over-
tones of mental distress as in defamation.' "143 On the other
hand, "the State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity'
is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his
act in part to encourage such entertainment," much like the
interests behind patent and copyright law.' This distinction
question was based on federal law, it is not clear whether implementation of the first
amendment interest took the form of a Federal Constitutional privilege or a substan-
tive limitation on the state common law right. If the latter, the United States Supreme
Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, even though federal considerations
may have been involved in delimiting the state cause of action. The safer course would
have been for the Court to remand for clarification. See id. at 582-83 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
'" Id. at 574-75.
140 Id.
,1 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
1,2 424 U.S. 448 (1976). For an analysis of this change in attitude, see text accom-
panying notes 35-52 supra.
"' 433 U.S. at 573.
1'4 Id.
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involves not only a rather narrow view of the falsification tort, 5
it also presupposes that the proprietary interest is entitled to
greater deference than is personal reputation, an assumption of
arguable validity. Such an evaluation is especially questiona-
ble in light of the holding in Gertz that the state's interest in
providing redress for harm to reputation is sufficient to allow
a private individual to recover from a negligent media defen-
dant.
The Court further distinguished the two torts in terms of
the degree to which they interfered with the availability of
information. Justice White stated that in false light cases the
only way to protect the interests involved is to attempt to mini-
mize publication of the harmful material, whereas in the case
of the right to publicity there is no limitation on publication.
"The only question is who gets to do the publishing."1" Thus,
liability could be imposed without interfering with the supply
of information. However, viewing the question of publication
from the perspective of potential dissemination, the Court
seems mistaken. In disseminating information to the public,
the question of "who" often dictates the extent of distribution.
It seems clear that the news media have a far greater potential
distribution and audience than the live performance itself or
advertisements of the performance. Thus, focusing exclusively
on public exposure, there may be a reduction in publication
depending upon "who gets to do the publishing."
C. The Proprietary Interest of Zacchini
Although the majority spent a good deal of time in an
attempt to distinguish prior defamation decisions and Time,
Inc. v. Hill4' from the "right to publicity," the thrust of the
Zacchini opinion centered on the proprietary or commercial
interest involved and its similarity to copyright and patent
'" See text accompanying notes 111-18 supra for discussion of three separate,
although related, interests protected by the false light tort.
"1 433 U.S. at 573.
1,7 Id. at 574. In addition to specifically distinguishing Time, Inc. v. Hill, the
Supreme Court also stated that its defamation decisions, New York Times, Rosen-
bloom, Gertz, and Firestone, furnished no substantial support for the Ohio Supreme
Court's privilege ruling since the defamation decisions "all involved the reporting of
events; in none of them was there an attempt to broadcast or publish an entire act for
which the performer ordinarily gets paid." Id.
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protection. The Court felt that "[t]he broadcast of a film of
petitioner's entire act pose[d] a substantial threat to the eco-
nomic value of that performance," and that the "same consid-
eration under[lying] the patent and copyright laws" required
protection of petitioner's right to publicity as "an economic
incentive for him to make the investment required to produce
a perfornance of interest to the public."14'
The majority's reliance on patent and copyright law, how-
ever, appears misplaced. As the Court mentioned, the policy
underlying the protection of literary works and scientific inven-
tions is the encouragement of creative activity for the benefit
of the public. Legal protection for authors and inventors is
viewed as a necessary impetus to the full realization of creative
efforts, of which the public is the beneficiary."' Such stimula-
tion of creativity and ingenuity takes two basic forms-an eco-
nomic incentive and the egoistic desire for recognition. 50 The
latter rationale was certainly not involved in Zacchini since the
newscast identified the "great Zacchini" as the performer, and
the presentation was accompanied by favorable commentary." '
The primary stimulus provided by the patent and copy-
right laws, and the one on which the Supreme Court relied, is
economic: the right to exploit one's creations. Justice White's
majority opinion continually referred to respondent's interfer-
ence with the commercial value of petitioner's performance.
However, when the facts of the case are examined, it is clear
10 Id. at 575-76. In emphasizing the policy behind the patent and copyright laws,
the Court noted:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commen-
surate with the services rendered.
Id. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stem, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
" ' See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1180, 1186 (1970).
,"I To the economic rationale of copyright law, Nimmer adds a privacy inter-
est-the desire of an author "to create a work merely as an act of self-expression,
intending it for himself alone, or for only a selected and limited group of others." He
notes that the law has respected this interest through the concept of common law
copyright. Id. at 1186-87. See also Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc. 244
N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968).
,"1 433 U.S. at 564 n. 1. (1977).
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that there was no economic benefit gained by the television
station nor any economic damage to Zacchini. Although a tele-
vision station realizes advertising revenue and is operated for
profit, it cannot be contended that the defendant station
earned any additional commercial benefit from its fifteen-
second film clip of Zacchini's act,'52 "The report was part of an
ordinary daily news program," and "is a routine example of the
press fulfilling the informing function so vital to our system.' '5 3
The majority's reference to unjust enrichment and its citation
of cases of unauthorized commercial broadcasts of sporting
events and other performances from which the broadcaster
kept the profits'54 are totally inapposite.
The Court's concern with the threat to the economic value
of the plaintiffs performance is also unfounded. Since persons
attending the fair were not charged a separate admission fee to
see Zacchini's performance,'55 it is likely that he received a flat
fee from the fair's sponsors for his appearance. Assuming such
an arrangement, Zacchini suffered no harm from the broadcast
even if it caused a decrease in the size of his audience or in
general fair attendance.
Even assuming that Zacchini's remuneration was depen-
dent on total fair admissions, it is doubtful that he was finan-
cially damaged. If some members of the public who would have
attended the fair primarily to witness the human cannonball
act did not do so due to the telecast of the performance, any
such decline in attendance was surely more than offset by re-
sondent's free advertising and the resulting increased public
"I Courts have repeatedly held that although news is published for profit, the
presentation of a newsworthy event is not a publication for a "trade purpose." See
Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952); Sarat Lahiri v. Daily
Mirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 390 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Humiston v. University Film Mfg.
Co., 178 N.Y.S. 752, 756 (App. Div. 1919). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF ToRTs
806-07 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 652C, comment d at 19,
(Tent. Draft No. 21, 1976).
2 433 U.S. at 580 (Powell, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 576. Citing an article by Professor Kalven, the majority opinion stated:
The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straightfor-
ward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social
purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plain-
tiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay.
Id. (quoting Kalven, supra note 34, at 331).
Im Id. at 563.
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interest in Zacchini's act. This favorable result appears even
more likely in light of the fact that the newscast contained
stimulating commentary and concluded with the statement:
"[the act] is a thriller . . .and you really need to see it in
person . . . to appreciate it."'' 5 In addition, the film clip and
commentary were aired by a station in Cleveland, a metropoli-
tan area twenty miles from the little town where the plaintiff
was performing. Thus due to the increased exposure gratui-
tously provided by the defendant, the economic value of the
performance was undoubtedly increased rather than de-
creased. '57 Anytime a member of the news media chooses to
make a presentation of a particular event or performance, the
publication or broadcast will customarily take the form of free
advertising and publicity. Such gratuitous exposure will not
only increase the immediate economic value of the act, but will
also help to build long term reputation, thus producing future
economic benefits for the player or performer. Any unjust en-
richment seems to have fallen on Zacchini.
The Zacchini decision may be the best indication yet of
the current Supreme Court's restrictive attitude toward the
press.158 In both analysis and holding, the opinion betrays an
' Id. at 564 n. 1.
,5 The majority itself seems to have recognized this fact. Justice White stated in
a footnote:
It is possible, of course, that respondent's news broadcast increased the
value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest in
seeing the act live. In these circumstances, petitioner would not be able to
recover. But petitioner has alleged that the broadcast injured him to the
extent of $25,000,. . ., and we think the State should be allowed to authorize
compensation of this injury if proven.
Id. at 575 n.12.
"' But see, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 46
U.S.L.W. 4546 (U.S. May 31, 1978) (No. 76-1484), where a 5-3 majority approved the
search of a newspaper office for evidence of crime even though no one on the newspa-
per's staff was under investigation or was suspected of criminal activity. Such a prac-
tice was sanctioned under the fourth amendment by virtue of demonstration of proba-
ble cause and the acquisition of a search warrant. The Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's affirmance of the district court's determination that freedom of the press
required a subpeona duces tecum, rather than a warrant, for a search of a newspaper
office. The majority concluded that first amendment interests were adequately pro-
tected by requiring courts to apply fourth amendment warrant standards with
"particular exactitude" in this class of cases.
This decision is likely to have a significant limiting effect on freedom of the press
and on the concomitant flow of information to the public. First, and most dramati-
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approach lacking sensitivity to freedom of the press and may
result in further inhibitions"' on publication and broadcast.
D. The Intent of the Publisher
Given the Zacchini majority's reliance on the policy under-
lying the patent and copyright laws in terms of the need to
protect the commercial value of one's creations, a more sensi-
tive and sensible approach would have been to adopt the test
suggested by Justice Powell in dissent and used by the Ohio
Supreme Court and other courts. That standard, rather than
focusing on the quantity of what was published, e.g., "entire
act," focuses on the intent of the publisher or broadcaster. If
such intent is commercial exploitation, the privilege to publish
newsworthy matter is forfeited. In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Powell argued:
[The Court] should direct initial attention to the actions of
the news media: what use did the station make of the film
footage? When a film is used, as here, for a routine portion
of a regular news program, I would hold that the First
Amendment protects the station from a "right of publicity"
or "appropriation" suit, absent a strong showing by the plain-
tiff that the news broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for
private or commercial exploitation."6'
This is essentially the standard that had been applied by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in finding for the defendant:
The proper standard must necessarily be whether the matters
reported were of public interest, and if so, the press will be
liable for appropriation of a performer's right of publicity
only if its actual intent was not to report the performance,
but, rather, to appropriate the performance for some other
private use, or if the actual intent was to injure the performer.
cally, press access to sources of confidential information is likely to be reduced or
eliminated since confidentiality can no longer be guaranteed. Second, members of the
news media will themselves suppress stories for fear of newsroom searches. Finally,
reporters, in an effort to protect sources, may destroy their notes and certain informa-
tion in their files. This could have a devastating effect in the case of a libel suit where
such information is needed for documentation. So considered, the Stanford Daily case
is likely to have a pronounced debilitating effect on the press, significantly reducing
media coverage and reporting.
" Other possible inhibitions are discussed in sections I and II of this article.
'" 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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It might also be the case that the press would be liable if it
recklessly disregarded contract rights existing between the
plaintiff and a third person to present the performance to the
public but that question is not presented here.161
Under such a standard, Zacchini would have been entitled to
recover if, instead of merely presenting his act as part of a
newscast, the station had run the film of Zacchini each evening
prior to news time, accompanied by commentary saying, "Stay
tuned for the eleven o'clock news." Such use would clearly have
amounted to commercial appropriation and would have re-
quired the station to reimburse Zacchini for the value of his
performance as so used.
A standard based on the intent of the broadcaster has twin
v irtues. It not only implements the policy underlying patent
and copyright law by providing a remedy for commerical pir-
acy, it also safeguards the first amendment interest by protect-
ing the dissemination of newsworthy material to the public. As
such, this approach of focusing on the publisher's intent has
been utilized in other appropriation cases."6 2
For example, in Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc.,"5 3 a case fac-
tually similar to Zacchini, the plaintiff, a well-known animal
trainer, sued under the New York appropriation statute for the
telecast of his act which he had performed during halftime of
a professional football game. The broadcast was made without
Gautier's consent and was therefore in violation of his contract
with the program sponsors. The New York Court of Appeals
stated that "[w]hile one who is a public figure or is presently
" 351 N.E.2d 454, 461 (Ohio 1976).
'' See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (first amend-
ment did not entitle defendant to appropriate Cary Grant's likeness for use as a model
in its magazine); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1967) (recovery granted to professional golfers for the appropriation of their
names and biographies which defendant had used as part of a game he manufactured;
the court recognized that a public figure might be the proper subject of news or an
informative presentation, but that the privilege did not extend to commercialization);
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.), modified,
345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973) (defendant's marketing of its "Howard Hughes
Game" amounted to act of appropriation and not the dissemination of news concerning
the achievements of Howard Hughes); Current Audio, Inc., v. RCA Corp., 337
N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (first amendment bars right of publicity claim concern-
ing an interview with Elvis Presley included on a record, referred to as "talking maga-
zine," that disseminated information of public interest).
t- 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952).
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newsworthy may be the proper subject of news or informative
presentation, the privilege does not extend to commerciali-
zation of his personality through a form of treatment distinct
from the dissemination of news or information.""16 The court
held, however, that even though the performance fell between
two commercials, the act itself was not used for advertising or
trade purposes and thus the broadcast was privileged.'65
Even though most appropriation decisions focus on the
question of commercialization, as did Gautier, the sensitivity
of courts to first amendment considerations is reflected by the
decisions in Man v. Warner Bros., Inc.'6 and Paulsen v. Per-
sonality Posters, Inc."'6 Both of these cases held the use of the
plaintiff's act or likeness to be privileged under the first
amendment in spite of the commercial exploitation involved.
E. Problems with the Zacchini Standard
The test employed by the Zacchini majority is not only
insensitive to the interest underlying freedom of the press, it is
also both over and underinclusive in terms of its economic
rationale. A standard based on whether a person's "entire act"
was broadcast fails to focus adequately on the commercial val-
ues involved: it includes some cases lacking the element of
commercial exploitation and it ignores others where there is
26 Id. at 488.
265 Id. It should be noted that the action in Gautier was based on § 51 of the NEw
YORK Crv. RIGms LAw. This statute provides no remedy unless a person's name,
portrait, or picture is used "for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade."
However, given the court of appeals' concern for the first amendment interest, it is
likely that its decision would not have been different under the common law concept
of appropriation.
Regarding jurisdictions with appropriation statutes, it should be emphasized that
the Zacchini "entire act" formula will not expose television newscasts to liability for
the presentation of a film clip of an event or performance unless such telecast is "for
the purpose of advertising" or "for trade purposes." See CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3344 (West
Supp. 1977); N.Y. Civ. RIHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976); OKuA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 839.1 (West Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8, -9 (1953); VA. CODE § 8-650
(1950).
1" 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (a musician who played "mess call" on his
flugelhorn at the Woodstock rock music festival was denied recovery although his
performance was included in a commercial motion picture of the event).
" ' 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (a comedian, a mock presidential candidate,
was denied recovery for the appropriation of his photograph on a large poster together
with the words "FOR PRESIDENT".)
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such economic appropriation. Zacchini is an example of the
former class, and any commercial use of less than an entire
performance is an example of the latter. '
The major vice of the Zacchini opinion lies not so much in
the application of its analysis to the facts but rather in the
uncertainty it creates for the news media. What is, or is not,
an "entire act?" As suggested by Justice Powell:
I doubt that this formula provides a standard clear enough
even for resolution of this case ....
Although the record is not explicit, it is unlikely that the
"act" commenced abruptly with the explosion that launched
petitioner on his way, ending with the landing in the net a
few seconds later. One may assume that the actual firing was
preceded by some fanfare, possibly stretching over several
minutes, to heighten the audience's anticipation: introduc-
tion of the performer, description of the uniqueness and dan-
ger, last-minute checking of the apparatus, and entry into the
cannon, all accompanied by suitably ominous commentary
from the master of ceremonies. If this is found to be the case
on remand, then respondent could not be said to have appro-
priated the "entire act" in its 15-second newsclip-and the
Court's opinion then would afford no guidance for resolution
of the case. Moreover, in future cases involving different per-
formances, similar difficulties in determining just what con-
stitutes the "entire act" are inevitable. 69
Self-censorship produced by the "chilling effect" of
Zacchini might well be significant. Anytime a news editor is
presented with film coverage of an event which raises doubts
about whether it constitutes an "entire act," coverage is likely
to be abbreviated to still pictures and verbal descriptions. This
possibility is especially acute regarding sporting events. Is a
television station privileged to show a film of a baseball player
hired to hit home runs, hitting a home run; a football player
running eighty yards for a touchdown; a boxer knocking out his
I" See cases cited in note 162 supra for several examples of exploitation. Note that
the Supreme Court did not foreclose the imposition of liability where less than an
'entire act" was broadcast. The holding, however, was limited to the facts presented.
See the Court's language in the text accompanying note 140 supra.
"I Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 579 and n.1 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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opponent in the tenth round; a cowboy riding a bull in a rodeo;
a ski jumper flying through the air to win a ski jump; or an ice
skater's performance? Such questions are especially trouble-
some in light of the commercial value attached to the identity
of many athletes. The examples of potential liability are not,
however, limited to the arena of sport, and in any case where
news coverage is reduced, "[t]he public is then the loser." '
Whenever a member of the news media feels legally inhibited
from presenting film coverage of an event or performance, the
public will be left with something less than "the kind of news
reportage that the First Amendment is meant to foster." ' This
fear led the Ohio Supreme Court to conclude:
The press, if it is to be able to freely report matters of public
interest, must be accorded broad latitude in its choice of how
much it presents of each story or incident, and of the empha-
sis to be given to such presentation. No fixed standard which
would bar the press from reporting or depicting either an
entire occurrence or an entire discrete part of a public per-
formance can be formulated which would not unduly restrict
the "breathing room" in reporting which freedom of the press
requires.'
In summary, the majority in Zacchini inadequately distin-
guished the privacy tort of falsification, unfortunately focused
on Zacchini's proprietary interest instead of the publisher's
intent, and used a standard of liability which signals a dra-
matic reduction in press freedom. One thing further should be
mentioned. It may be that the Court's philosophy of freedom
of the press, when viewed in regard to mass publication torts,
has again reared its head in Zacchini. Gertz, Firestone, and
Cox Broadcasting indicate a view of the first amendment which
focuses on the concept of legitimate public interest and which
provides protection against media torts only if the publication
or broadcast is of matter serving a self-governing function, i.e.,
material with sociopolitical content. This policy may have in-
fluenced the majority in Zacchini, leading it to conclude that
a media presentation of a public performance was not entitled
'T* Id. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting).
I' Id.




to protection. Regardless of the general public interest in an act
like Zacchini's, it is not relevant to a governing purpose. "The
line between the informing and the entertaining"'7 3 may no
longer be nearly so elusive.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent defamation decisions indicate
a restrictive approach toward freedom of the press, at least as
far as mass publication torts are concerned. The privacy ac-
tions also appear destined to follow this trend. Time, Inc. v.
Hill has apparently been overruled by Gertz, thereby permit-
ting a private plaintiff to recover for nondefamatory falsifica-
tion based on a showing of media negligence. Although Cox
Broadcasting v. Cohn held a media report of information ob-
tained from judicial records to be privileged against a public
disclosure claim, this result is not inconsistent with the Court's
emerging policy in this area. The Court in Cox emphasized the
importance of media reporting on governmental operations as
such operations are revealed through public records. Such a
rationale is certainly consistent with the Court's apparent phi-
losophy of limiting "free" press to the reporting of matters
serving the informing function essential to self-government. In
a future public disclosure case not involving public records, the
Court is likely to sanction liability based on a standard com-
bining "legitimate public interest" and "offensiveness." If this
possibility materializes, it has the potential to be much more
devastating to freedom of the press than does liability for defa-
mation. Defamation contains an inherent safeguard for a pub-
lisher through the requirement that the statements be false.
This allows the press a degree of self-protection through verifi-
cation. However, in the case of public disclosure, the inapplica-
bility of the defense of truth leaves withholding of publication
as the only sure defense. Such self-censorship is the probable
result unless the publisher is certain that the story is relevant
to the governing function. This restraint will have the effect of
screening out much information of unquestioned accuracy,
some of which may be useful to survival in a complex society
11 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (quoting Winter's v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
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and, consequently, sociopolitically important.
The most recent example of the Supreme Court's attitude
toward media reporting in relation to publication and broad-
cast torts is Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. Al-
though in Zacchini the Court claimed to have chosen the com-
mercial or proprietary interest over the interest in a free press,
they made this determination in a case where there was neither
an intent to injure or appropriate a property interest nor an
injury to this interest in fact. Additionally, the value of the
right to publicity would not customarily be reduced by a media
news broadcast. Implicit in the decision is a re-emergence of
the Court's philosophy of free press in relation to mass publica-
tion injuries-limiting privileged media reporting to matters at
the core of self-government. The decision is difficult to justify
in other terms. If Zacchini had no claim for invasion of privacy
because his act was both public and newsworthy, it appears
anomolous to hold that he nevertheless had a claim based on
the "right to publicity" for the telecast of a news program that
showed a fifteen-second film of his performance for a non-
commercial purpose, and which, no doubt, provided substan-
tial economic benefit to him.
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